Everything you need to know about Repeat Clickers, our courses, and how we tackle the repeat clicker problem.
Every information security team knows the score. The same names appearing on the phishing simulation report month after month, clicking links with a cheerful consistency. Despite training, warnings, and the occasional exasperated email from IT, the behaviour doesn't change.
Often, the problem isn't the clickers. Instead, it's often the organisation's lack of behavioural expertise. Cybersecurity teams are exceptionally good at understanding technical threats but rarely trained in the psychology of why people do what they do. Repeat clicking isn't a knowledge problem. Most offenders know they shouldn't click suspicious links. It's a behavioural problem, driven by habit, cognitive overload, stress or some other issue.
Without that expertise, organisations end up treating a psychological issue with a technical solution. The one-size-fits-all approach makes things worse. A sixty-year-old administrator processing hundreds of emails a day has an entirely different risk profile to a twenty-five-year-old in sales. Pushing both through the same e-learning module ignores everything we know about effective behaviour change. Generic interventions produce generic results.
Inconsistent delivery compounds the problem further. Security training is frequently deprioritised, delivered by whoever's available, or squeezed into an annual compliance slot everyone forgets by February. Behaviour change requires repetition and reinforcement over time. An occasional seminar followed by six months of silence is not an intervention. It's a gesture.
And underpinning all of it is the simplest problem of all. Security teams are already overwhelmed. Patches, incidents, compliance deadlines, threat monitoring. The day job leaves no room for the slow, consistent, specialist work that behaviour change actually requires. The repeat clicker problem is solvable. But not by a team that's already stretched.
There are several reasons why generic cyber security awareness training such as KnowBe4, ProofPoint and Metacompliance don't work for repeat offenders.
What works instead:
Auditors aren't trying to catch anyone out. They want to understand whether your organisation is actively managing risk and following its own processes. When it comes to repeat offenders, they typically want to see a few key things:
In short, auditors want to see that repeat offenders are noticed, addressed, tracked and that your organisation can show that its approach actually reduces risk over time.
By targeting the specific behaviours or knowledge areas that led to failure, it demonstrates a thoughtful, graduated response. Each of our repeat clicker coaching sessions is documented, allowing auditors to verify both participation and content. Follow-up metrics, such as improved phishing simulation scores or improved incident reporting rates, show that the interventions actually work. SecureClick's remedial training turns isolated failures into measurable improvements, satisfying regulators and reinforcing a culture of accountability.
When an employee falls for a phishing attack, punishment is seldom the answer. A lapse here or there does not merit dismissal or even a stern telling-off. Phishing ought to be treated much like a slip on a wet floor: as a sign that the workplace needs fixing, not that the worker is incompetent. Those who open risky emails are often let down by poor training, unclear rules or inadequate defences. Leaping to discipline risks discouraging people from owning up to their mistakes, making the organisation less secure, not more.
Yet serial offenders cannot be indulged forever. Once an employee has received tailored training, personal coaching and honest feedback — and once the firm has put sensible safeguards in place — persistent clicking can become a liability. What began as an honest mistake evolves into a failure to follow established protocol. At that point, discipline is not only defensible but necessary, so long as it is transparent, consistent and grounded in policy that has been clearly explained.
The right approach is both graduated and documented. Start with formal warnings tied to company rules, set a deadline for improvement and spell out what happens if things do not change. Only in the gravest cases — after training has been offered, technical guardrails applied and fair warning given — should reassignment or dismissal be on the table. This measured escalation protects your organisation without tipping into vindictiveness, aligning individual accountability with broader risk-management goals.
The guiding principle is simple: phishing failures are learning opportunities until they become a pattern of recklessness. Handled this way, firms can strike a balance between security, staff development and fairness — a balance that, when got right, bolsters both defences and actually enhances the security culture of your organisation.
Disciplining employees for repeated phishing failures requires judgment, not reflex. A single lapse, or even several, rarely warrants punishment. Organisations do better to treat phishing vulnerabilities as they would any workplace safety hazard: a prompt to educate, not castigate. Employees who click malicious links are often let down by patchy training, unclear expectations or inadequate defences. Jumping straight to discipline can often be perceived as arbitrary — and worse, it may discourage people from admitting mistakes, which only compounds the security risk.
Persistent failures are another matter. Once an organisation has offered targeted support — proper training, one-to-one coaching, honest feedback — and put sensible safeguards in place, repeated unsafe behaviour becomes a liability. What started as an honest slip turns into refusal to follow basic protocols. At that point, discipline is not only defensible but necessary, so long as it is transparent, consistent and grounded in clearly explained policies.
The right approach is measured and documented. Begin with formal warnings tied to company rules, set deadlines for improvement and spell out what happens if behaviour does not change. Only in the most serious cases — after training, technical fixes and fair warnings — should reassignment or dismissal enter the conversation.
The principle is simple: treat phishing failures as teachable moments until they reveal a pattern of carelessness or deliberate neglect. Remedial training, when properly tailored to individual weaknesses, transforms the equation entirely. An employee who once clicked indiscriminately learns to spot warning signs, pause before acting and report suspicious messages as a matter of course. Over time, what began as vulnerability becomes vigilance. The workforce grows alert without becoming fearful, security incidents decline, and cyber hygiene shifts from corporate mandate to ingrained habit. That is when defences are not merely adequate but genuinely resilient.